The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal is the most important source of international arbitral decisions for at least the past half century, and its decisions have contributed significantly to the development of international law and the law of international commercial transactions. Judge Aldrich, who is the only member of the Tribunal to have served since its inception in 1981, has written what will be recognised as the definitive book about the jurisprudence of the Tribunal. The book seeks to preserve and (...) to make accessible the substantial body of Awards and Decisions rendered by the Tribunal during the years since it was established in. Its hundreds of Awards and Decisions may be individually consulted but hitherto there has been no detailed analytical guide through the vast published work of the Tribunal. This important new book provides a two-fold service. First, it quotes from the most significant Awards and Decisions at sufficient length so that both their substance and the reasoning of the Tribunal can be understood from access to the present volume alone. Second, it organizes and summarizes the decisions to facilitate finding complete texts relevant to any particular issue. (shrink)

There is a well-worn image and phrase for libertarianism: "atomized individualism." This hobgoblin has spread so thoroughly that even some libertarians think their philosophy unreservedly supports private persons, whatever the situation, whatever their behavior. Smith's Self-Interest and Social Order in Classical Liberalism, corrects this misrepresentation with careful intellectual surveys of Hume, Smith, Hobbes, Butler, Mandeville, and Hutcheson and their respective contributions to political philosophy.

The picture which one naturally presents of the situation is that which would arise before an observer placed outside the earth, who could watch the light wave starting from the central mirror and pursuing the distant mirror, catching up with it at some distance beyond the point at which it was when the light wave started. In this case the observer is able to locate the points at which the parts of the apparatus were at different moments and to measure (...) the distances between. We could simulate this situation on the earth by assuming an enclosed square car, from some point in which two balls were shot out in directions at right angles to each other to the walls of the car, bounding back to the point at which they started. We will assume that the balls move with uniform velocity going and coming, and we will assume that the car is moving. An observer outside the car who marked the point on the rail directly over the starting point and the points reached by the balls when they struck the sides of the car, and then measured the distances which the balls travelled, would find that the ball which travelled with the car covered a greater distance than that traversed by the ball which went at right angles to the direction of the train, and yet the balls would return to the starting point at the same moment, provided they travelled over both their paths at the same velocity during their entire trajects, i.e., the same velocity measured within the car. The observer would be at no difficulty to explain this, for he would see that the velocity in the direction of its motion of the car had to be added to that of balls within the car. That is not the case of the light wave. The velocity of a moving shining body is not added to that of the light wave. The wave motion being set up in ether travels with its own uniform velocity of approximately 300,000 kilometers a second. The light waves then, from the standpoint of the observer outside the earth, traverse through the stagnant ether different distances at a uniform velocity and yet the ether waves exhibit on their return none of the evidence which they should exhibit in the interferometer. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Philosophy of mind has made substantial progress on biologically-rooted approaches to understanding the mind and subjectivity through the enactivist perspective, but research on subjectivity within neuroscience has not kept apace. Indeed, we possess no principled means of relating experiential phenomena to neurophysiological processes. Here, we present the Nested States Model as a framework to guide empirical investigation into the relationship between subjectivity and neurobiology. Building on recent work in phenomenology and philosophy of mind, we develop an account of experiential states (...) as layered, or nested. We argue that this nested structure is also apparent in brain activity. The recognition of this structural homology — that both experiential and brain states can be characterized as systems of nested states — brings our views of subjective mental states into broad alignment with our understanding of general principles and properties of brain activity. This alignment enables a more systematic approach to formulating specific hypotheses and predictions about how the two domains relate to one another. (shrink)

My dissertation presents the outlines of a theory about knowledge and virtue. The core idea is that the nature of knowledge is best understood by reflecting on its role in intellectual practice. What distinguishes knowledge from true opinion is not primarily its causal history or its internal structure, as standard theories argue, but rather the way in which knowledge is embedded or rooted in our styles of explanation, modes of communication and methods of teaching. Knowledge becomes rooted in our practices (...) through the cultivation and exercise of intellectual virtue, or the dispositions and skills needed to master varieties of theoretical and practical reasoning. The link to virtuous intellectual activity is what makes knowledge more valuable than true opinion. This suggests that the virtues of intellectual practice are central to our understanding of the nature of knowledge. I devote the first half of the dissertation to showing why we need a theory of virtue in epistemology and how in general that theory ought to be formulated. In the second half, I address skeptical objections and other problems that arise during my formulation of the theory. ;The starting point is a puzzle from Plato's Meno about the value of knowledge. As Socrates observed, true belief has the same practical value as knowledge. So why should we prefer the one to the other or even distinguish between the two? Most philosophers agree that true belief is not enough for knowledge, but there is little agreement about what it lacks and why the distinction matters. Standard attempts to fill this gap either conceive knowledge as true belief with the right kind of causal history or as responsibly formed belief with the right kind of rational structure. But neither strategy is satisfactory because neither adequately reflects the role that knowledge plays in intellectual practice. This suggests that there is something wrong with the standard belief-theoretic analysis of knowledge. I develop a new account of the nature and value of knowledge that better explains the connection between the norms of virtuous inquiry and the goal of understanding. (shrink)

Anarchism is a theory of the good society, in which justice and social order are maintained without the State (or government). Many anarchists in the libertarian movement (including myself) were heavily influenced by the epistemological and moral theories of Ayn Rand. According to these anarchists, Rand's principles, if consistently applied, lead necessarily to a repudiation of government on moral grounds.

Individualism is one of most criticized and least understood ideas in social and political thought. Is individualism the ability to act independently amidst a web of social forces? A vital element of personal liberty and a shield against conformity? Does it lead to or away from unifying individuals with communities? Individualism: A Reader provides a wealth of illuminating essays from the 17th to the early 20th centuries. In 26 selections from 25 writers individualism is explained and defended, often from unusual (...) perspectives. This anthology includes not only selections from well-known writers, but also many lesser-known pieces--reprinted here for the first time--by philosophers, social theorists, and economists who have been overlooked in standard accounts of individualism. The depth and complexity of ideas about individualism are reflected in the six sections in this collection. The first examines individuality generally, with the following five detailing social, moral, political, religious, and economic individualism. Throughout, individualism is analyzed and defended through the lenses of classical liberalism, free-market libertarianism, individual anarchism, voluntary socialism, religious individualism, abolitionism, free thought, and radical feminism. Both richly historical and sharply contemporary, Individualism: A Reader provides a multitude of perspectives and insights on personal liberty and the history of freedom. (shrink)